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In their introduction to Karl Marx, Bottom ore and Rubel comment that 
Marx used the term ideology in 'different senses'; and in one of these 
senses, ideology for Marx, is a 'deliberately misleading system of ideas'. 
(1963; 21). The sense in which I wish to use this word will differ from the 
former, by expunging the modifiers 'deliberately misleading'. This is 
not to deny that the construction of ideology is non-accidental to the 
extent that it arises from sustained social practices; nor is it to deny that 
ideologies can be nurtured deliberately in the sense of receiving a coherent-
seeming philosophico-logical rationale in the un-commonsense reflec-
tions of a community. Elshtain (1981) shows how the ideology of 
womanhood has been so nurtured in the western traditions; and 
Wearing's empirical study (1984) confirms the power of that ideology, 
which controls women's perceptions of their role(s) in society to this 
day. However, ideologies live through the common everyday actions-
both, verbal and non-verbal- of a host of social actors who are far from 
thinking consciously about it. In fact, if ideology is a misleading system 
of ideas, then conscious deliberation, once it becomes accessible, is likely 
to lead to exposure, and could conceivably become instrumental in 
introducing change. Looked at from this perspective, the most important 
attribute for the maintenance of ideology appears to be its socially 
constructed inevitability. Again, a system of ideas can definitely be 
misleading even while it is being supported by an over-arching, most 
dear-sighted-seeming analysis of social phenomena; but the very 
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description of some analysis as 'over-arching' or 'most clear-sighted' 
implies a point of view. One misleading system of ideas can be replaced 
by another ideology, which may in its turn be revealed as a misleading 
system of ideas. There is no intention to make a play on words here, but 
in one sense, at least, ideology cannot be misleading since it leads us to 
the essential principles governing the social structure in which the 
ideology is embedded and for which it provides support. Thus it becomes 
diagnostic of the values that (some section of) a community lives by. For 
these reasons, I prefer to think of ideology as a socially constructed 
system of ideas which appears as if inevitable. 
I shall be concerned here with the ideology of woman's work- that is 
to say the system of ideas that surrounds the work women do in the 
privacy of their homes. Of course, the ideology of woman's work can be 
viewed from many angles; my own focus is limited- I am interested not 
in how the ideology came to be constructed - i.e. what is its historical 
genesis in the West- but in how the constructed ideology is transmitted. 
And my answer to even this limited question is not a complete one, since 
it is based on an interpretation of mother-child talk, which is neither 
supplemented by father-child talk nor a first hand observation of 
patterns of daily living. 
The conversations which form the basis of my answer were collected 
from 24 mother-child dyads in and around Sydney. All mothers were 
born and brought up in Australia; the average age of the children at the 
time of recording was approximately 3 years 8 months. The breakdown 
of the population is presented in Table 1. 
(A) (R) 
f.hl.l2. Low education; manual occupation Hi~~, e•i>Jcatin•·,, specldi1Le<1 joh 
£!.lU .f!.LU ~ 
Female 3 3 
ttale 3 3 3 
6 6 6 
Table 1: The Apprentices to Ideology 
.f!..!..l._2 
3 
6 
It does not appear necessary to explain the table further, since for the 
present discussion, the subclassification of the population is not highly 
relevant. The data consists of natural conversation between the child 
and the mother and was collected for an ARGS project to examine the 
role of mother's talk in establishing ways of learning. Working on this 
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project, with me, are Carmel Cloran and David Butt, though I alone am 
responsible for the views presented here. The recordings were made by 
the mothers themselves in their home environment. The mothers were 
requested to turn on the tape recorder whenever they felt that they were 
engaged in a chat with the child in question; no other requirements were 
made. On average each dyad took about six weeks to complete six hours 
of recording time, which, on average, yielded four hours of recorded 
tape. 
I should like to draw attention to the suitability of such conversation 
as a means of understanding adult preconceptions. To a large extent, all 
casual conversation is revealing about the shared assumptions of a 
community, precisely because of its unselfconscious, casual nature 
which mask~ its deeper social purposes and gives it the air of an activity 
that is directed toward nothing but the achievement of talk itself. But 
casual conversation between a close adult and a very young child is 
especially revealing in that often the very basic assumptions necessary 
for the continuity of talk have to be spelt out. With such young children, 
the comfort of sharing the same language does not go so far as to produce 
the assurance that the other 'understands' the sayings as the adult 
speaker does. Garfinkle (1967) provides several examples of the break-
down of conversation in which an experimenting student deliberately 
displayed inability to understand another's 'perfectly ordinary utter-
ances'. Example 1, is taken from his book to illustrate the point: 
Example 1: 
(S) Hi, Ray. How is your girlfriend feeling? 
(E) What do you mean, 'How is she feeling'? 
Do you mean physical or mental? 
(S) I mean how is she feeling? What's the matter with you? 
(He looked peeved.) 
(E) Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what do you 
mean? 
(S) Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming? 
(E) What do you mean, 'How are they'? 
(S) You know what I mean. 
(E) I really don't. 
(S) What's the matter with you? Are you sick? 
(Garfinkle: 1967; p.42) 
But this posture of 'you know what I mean' cannot always be adopted 
in regard to very young children's questions. In the following extract 
Kirsty (3;7) is discussing with her mother the death of a moth whose 
wings had got steamed when it flew too low over a hot drink. The child is 
deeply concerned, and on the verge of tears, because she believes ' .. .it 
wouldn't have wanted to die'. In the midst of this serious discussion, her 
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attention is distracted by her younger sister's behaviour, who is 
busying herself with tearing some paper. This leads to the exchange 
below: 
Example 2: 
C: That's[? broken] ... Rebecca teared it. 
M: She what? 
C: Teared. 
M: Oh it's O.K. 
C: Why's it O.K.? 
M: Pete just brought it home for me to have a look but he 
didn't need to keep it. 
C: Why didn't he? 
M: Oh. Oh I don't know. (LAUGHING) I don't think he 
needed to keep it... He'd probably read it already. 
C: Why he probably read it already? 
M: Urn I think if he had wanted to keep it and he needed it he 
would have told me to put it somewhere safe. But he 
put it there which is the place where we put stuff we 
don't really care about. That's why I think that he 
didn't need it. Either he'd already read it or he didn't 
want it.* 
It is only at this point, that presumably satisfied, Kirsty returns to the 
question of life and death which had preoccupied her_ earlier. Probings 
by children, then, produce the near optimal environment for an 
explanation of those very phenomena which we consider most ordinary, 
most inevitable and most self-evident. 
And there is an important difference between Garfinkle's experiment-
ing students and young children; unlike the students, the children are 
not being meta-textual: they are actually engaged in constructing the 
text of their immediate culture. So talk becomes a vehicle of learning the 
taken-for-granted aspects of lived reality. Of course this in not the only 
vehicle. The data shows the acuteness of children's observation. When 
Alison (3;5) helps mother make coffee, she observes her own actions, 
performed under the mother's close supervision; so much coffee per cup, 
so much sugar and then hot water and then milk. 'Ah' says Alison 'milk 
after'. 'Yeah' says the mother 'You gotta pour milk after'. 
*Transcription conventions: M = mother; C = child;[? ] =unintelligible;[?+ 
item(s)] = item(s) not clearly intelligible, best guess in view of contextual, 
co-textual and phonological clues; ( ) = encloses contextual comment, not 
evident from wording alone; large square bracket left open covers overlapping 
speech by the dyad. 
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With so much listening and talking, so much confirming by observa-
tion, the picture of woman's work is constructed for the child through 
the innumerable small moments of everyday life. I have chosen to talk 
about this aspect precisely because across the spectrum of my data, this 
picture emerges with a certain degree of homogeneity- a homogeneity 
that the data may very well not possess in some other respects. This 
explains my earlier comment that the subclassification of the popula-
tion is irrelevant, where the study of the ideology of woman's work from 
this data is concerned. It does not matter which section of the population 
the mothers belong to, they share similar views about woman's work. 
While not every dyad presents each of the features I dicuss below, each 
displays some combination, and none contradicts any of the features. So 
while the total picture is a synthesis, I believe it respects the mothers' 
views as displayed in their talk. Let me first spell out the four most 
outstanding kinds of things that these women with small children, with 
or without husbands, take in their stride every day of the week, every 
week of the year. 
(i) First, every woman is an instructor. Quite irrespective of her place 
in the social hierarchy, every woman taking care of a small child is 
exposed to innumerable searching questions. These questions cover an 
enormous range: who looked after me when you were a baby, why is 
Johnny fatter than me, why are those clouds grey, why do you put 
parsley in water, don't birds talk like us and how does the lavatory chain 
work and do chickens have knees? Now there is no implication at all that 
the answers are always accurate, or that they are always provided. 
Sometimes questions get lost in the flow of conversation; sometimes 
they are answered tautologically, but it can be claimed with confidence 
that in every mother-child dyad there is evidence of effort to explain. I 
suspect that the differences will lie in kind of explanations offered and 
the frequency with which they are offered. 
(ii) Every woman is a labourer. As I remarked earlier, the setting for 
these conversations is everyday life. The conversations construct the 
picture of these women as busy around the house with cooking and 
washing, getting the kids to bed, getting them ready for school and 
ministering to their needs. Outside the house, there is the shopping and 
the garden. 
(iii) Every woman provides emotional support to the child/children in 
the house; this can take the form of praise, concern over a physical hurt 
or the dispensation of justice if it is needed. 
(iv) And finally every woman is a companion to her child. By 
companionship I mean that the mothers put time and effort into 
activities which are primarily for the diversion of the young child, 
participating in colouring pictures, playing with trains and car sets, 
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joining in the football or the cricket game - whatever is going on. 
The nature of my data does not permit me to make any systematic 
comments on the activities of these women in relation to other members 
-particularly, the adults of the household. No doubt mothers talk to 
other members of the family, both adults and other children; no doubt, 
they have friends and neighbours. And, no doubt, apart from these four 
aspects listed above, there is more to every woman's work. The reason I 
restrict myself to just these four aspects lies in the fact that proof of the 
mother's engaging in these four types of activities can be provided 
directly from my data; and for the present discussion, I am limiting 
myself entirely to what is in the data, ignoring other parameters whose 
relevance I would definitely accept. 
Now, if the findings were limited to simply a construction of these 
four facets of every woman's work, there would be nothing remarkable. 
It is common knowledge that women do these things; and we, perhaps, 
need no research project to show that this is how it is. Let me now shift 
my focus, by raising the question: how do these women present 
themselves and their work to the children, in the course of their talk? 
Let us first look at the instructor role. It is remarkable how 
consistently mothers underplay this role. There is not one instance in 
the entire data, where a mother can be found to claim credit for having 
solved a problem, for having worked out, even cooperatively with tho: 
child, an explanation to some phenomenon. On the contrary, there i!; 
evidence that, at least some mothers, explicitly emphasize the picture of 
'silly mummy'. Here is Helen's mother in Example 3. She is a 
remarkably capable woman, and the evidence of her ability to think on 
her toes can be found across her conversations with Helen. Here she is 
finding out what Helen did at pre-school that day. 
Example3 
C: Play with the playdough. 
M: And what else? 
C: And you forgot my painting! 
M: Did you do a painting? ... You didn't tell me ... 
C: Well you should've looked at the[? ] on those cupboards. 
M: Oh I know but I'm such a forgetful mother you should 
know by now you have to tell my you have to remind me about 
these things because I - my brain doesn't work too well 
sometimes. 
C:Mum. 
M:Mm? 
C: All you have to do is tell the teachers if you forget. 
M: Trouble is I forget to tell the teachers. 
Ontogenesis of ideology 131 
This is not an isolated instance; nor is the 'silly mummy' picture 
limited to one class. Of course, a simple rationale for such behaviour is 
easy to find: it makes the child feel superior; and, after all, should it not 
be regarded as simply a 'game', a 'pretence' whose aim is to boost the 
child's ego? I have no clear-cut answer to this question, but I cannot help 
wondering if such behaviour is totally unrelated to the popular picture 
of woman as somewhat lacking in intellect. In reviewing the Fontana 
Biographical Companion to Modern Thought (Bullock & Woodings) for 
The Sunday Times(2 October 1983), John Vincent pointed out how 
thinking as an intellectual enterprise is seen by the authors to be the 
preserve of the white male: 
Thinking, it appears, is what white males do. The most 
numerous peoples, the Indians and Chinese, do not figure. 
TheJaps seem to get along splendidly without thinkers. All 
three lag behind speakers of Portuguese. 
As for women, they are dragged in, as it were, by the hair: 
Marilyn Monroe, Iris Murdock, and Bessie Smith, Queen of 
the Blues, for instance. Less than one per cent of modern 
thought is female. Women are good at writing novels and 
being entertainers, but then they always were, back to 
Scheherzade. 
Of course, we could shrug off this publication as an example of the 
authors' unthinking bias; but two points appear relevant. First, there is 
very close relationship between unthinking biases and the maintenance 
of ideology; and, secondly, centuries and decades of unthinking biases, 
codified in scholarly tomes do represent that which by and large 
becomes 'fact'. 'Truth', we have the saying 'will out'. But, whose truth? 
and seen from what point of view? I do not think that it is fanciful to 
claim that it is codified 'fact' generated by unthinking biases that 
speaks every day out of the mouths of the mothers. In my view, this 
'fact' does not fall on fallow ground. If language plays any role in the 
development of consciousness - and I believe that it does - then, it 
must shape the consciousness of the apprentices to ideology, the 
mothers' children. 
Equally important is the question: Is there anyone else in the house 
who might say to the child: 'clever mummy'? My data of course provides 
no answer here. But it does have Julian's mother saying to him: 
I don't know ... you must be clever ... Maybe you got it from 
your Dad. 
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where it is the child's cleverness. Across the data, irrespective of the 
family's socio·economic location, with the exception of single-parent 
families, mothers do build an image of the fathers as the one who should 
know, as the one who is resourceful in finding practical solutions, as the 
one who is the locus of intellectual authority. Isn't it quite obvious that 
organising fourteen meals a week, for every week of the year, for a 
family of three or more requires no practical organization? And who ever 
heard of the need for 'rational thinking' in answering children's 
questions? Would you believe that knowing the names of all the herbs 
and spices is an accomplishment of the same order as knowing the 
names of all the tools in a carpentry set? Adrian's mother knows about 
the herbs anyway, but she also reels off the name and function of all but 
two items from a carpentry tool set. So she tells Adrian: 'Daddy'll know 
the names of them', which is more or less echoed by the child: 'Yes, he'll 
know all the names. Daddy'll know.' I would like to draw attention 
particularly to the near-certainty of the mother's prediction. It may be 
that Adrian's father, a banker by trade, is also an accomplished 
handyman, and the near-certainty of her prediction through the use of 
the auxiliary will (in reduced form) is justified. However, the interesting 
fact remains that in talking thus of their husbands, the mothers do not 
make use of the modals of lower orders of probability; we find 
Daddy'lllwill but, in such environments, we do not find Dad mightl-
maylcouldlperhaps be able to. Let me hasten to add that there is no 
implication that excellence cannot be shared by both partners; I simply 
do not have the data to confirm or refute this view. It is, however, 
remarkable that through thousands of transcribed messages these 
women's assessment of their own accomplishment is meagre in their 
own wordings, while, in many cases, their handling of the children's 
questions is relatively a contradiction of this assessment. 
If the mother's presentation of her instructor role ism uted, that of her 
role as labourer carries certain ambiguities which, at the least, are 
interesting to note. There are various strands to this. First, there is the 
view that the exertion and toil in the house are not work. Example 4 is a 
dialogue between Alison and her mother. 
Example 4 
C: Is Pop home? 
M: No ... They're all out. They're all at work. 
C: Bob and Mark are working. 
M: Yes, Bob's at work. Mark's at work. Everybody's at work. 
C: I not at work. 
M: No, you're only little. 
C: Youse at work? 
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M: I don't work. I look after you ... 
C: Who's playing with Pammie? 
M: Nobody. Who'd look after you if Mummy went to work ... eh? 
Not all mothers are as explicit about the non-work nature of their 
work at home; the view ranges from this to the mother in group B who 
comments that the child's grandmother does not babysit her anymore 
because the mother is no longer working. Small wonder, that in the 
Macquarie Dictionary, there is not one sense of worker that fits woman 
as a worker in her house. This definition is reproduced as Example 5 
below: 
Example 5: 
WORKER (2003) 
1. one who or that which works: he's a good steady worker. 
2. one employed in manual industrial labour. 
3. an employee, esp. as contrasted with a capitalist or a manager. 
4. one who works in a specified occupation: office workers, 
research workers. 
5. (in the U.S.S.R.) a citizen, excluding the peasants and members 
of the army or navy. 
6. Entomol. the sterile or infertile female of bees, wasps, ants, or 
termites, which does the work of the colony. 
7. Also working girl. Colloq. a prostitute. 
The nearest a woman engaged in woman's work comes to is sense 5, 
but we are not in the USSR; or to 6, but women with offspring are 
obviously not sterile or infertile, even though they may be busy as bees! 
There is then the paradox that when, as David's mother, one employs 
someone to look after the children, then that person is a worker, but the 
person whom she replaces is not a worker!! It would be a mistake to take 
Example 5 as an attack on the Macquarie Dictionary. It is no part of a 
dictionary to moralize; its business is to record the usage of the 
community. For the community, in general, woman's work is just not 
work, as the definition of 'work' in the same dictionary will show. By 
these 'fashions of speaking' (Wharf: 1956) whose motivation ultimately 
traces itself to the principles of the community's economic organization, 
a woman working in the privacy of her home is consigned to the grey 
space between the 'dole-bludger' and the 'honest worker', who brings 
home a 'decent pay', for his/her physical exertion. She is not even 
'self-employed'; she is 'house-wife'. The assumption is not lagging far 
behind that what a woman works at in her house is her private 
business, without any more consequence for the life of the community 
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than you or me polishing our shoes, or weeding our own private patch of 
the garden. 
The second strand to which I would draw attention is the presenta-
tion of the work as uninteresting. In Example 6 Cameron's mother is 
decidedly trying to get him off her hands; Cameron is interested in 
staying back to watch the cartoons, but note how much more is passing 
between the two interactants: 
Example 6 
M: [?You'll probably] have to get changed into your work clothes 
later, because Daddy's going to the tip. 
C: What for? 
M: Daddy needs a helper. 
C: Oh. 
M: When he goes to the tip. 
C: What? 
M: Daddy needs a helper when he goes to the tip. 
C: Oh I want to play on my bike. I don't want to go to the tip. 
M: You do? 
C: I want to stay here[? ] ... 
M: You haven't been to the tip[? with your Daddy] for a long time. 
C:No. 
M: It'd be much more interesting going to the tip than helping 
Mummy do the vacuuming. 
C:Mm. 
M: Because that's a boring job isn't it? 
C: I have to stay home to watch my cartoons. 
Now it is true that Cameron's mother wants him out of her way; but 
this is definitely not the whole of the story. For lack of space I have not 
included the remaining part of this dialogue covering about a page and a 
half, in which the mother points out to Cameron that he is behaving like 
Piggie Won't, whose brothers were adventurous, went out into the world 
and had fun while Piggie Won't, staying at home, missed out on 
everything worth doing. The same fate, she suggests, awaits Cameron 
unless he gets out to help Daddy at the tip instead of helping Mum 
cleaning the house. Kirsty's mother who shows exemplary patience and 
a sensitive understanding of her own children's needs, tells Kirsty: 
I think that you probably don't play with little kids because 
they're not very interesting most of the time. 
Cameron's mother discusses with him the various professions that he 
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might take up when he's big. The fire brigade, the police force and the 
construction and building trades are discussed in some detail. Cameron 
appears to work with a paradigm: If I can't be this, what can I be? As the 
possibilities of those professions which presently engage his attention 
are exhausted, he asks at least twice: Mum, what could I be in the home, 
in the house? Is it at all significant that Cameron's mother does not even 
'hear' this question? 
The household labour is a fact that impinges upon people in the house 
all the time - but it impinges upon them as a necessity, not as 
something that could ever be enjoyed. And this is the third strand. 
Pete's mother says: 
I have to take in laundry 
Daniel's mother echoes: 
I just have to go and get the washing in now, I'm afraid 
Sam's mother explains her tired yawn: 
I had to ge_t up twice last night because]ohnny kept crying. 
And, of course, many of the mothers say at one time or another, 
I have to fix the tea/dinner now. 
The modals of necessity and obligation come into full play. This is 
definitely not the only environment in which they appear; but this is one 
environment in which they are used with a high frequency. 
Finally, woman's work is presented as hard work, but in an oblique 
manner. It is an interesting aspect of this presentation that such 
comments on the part of the mother occur unexpectedly and fleetingly 
in the middle of some other activity, the course of which is hardly 
disturbed by such admissions. In Example 7 Julie's mother has been 
bathing her, playing with her daughter's toes and letting the daughter 
play with her own fingers. Julie is trying to get her mother's fingers 
soaped and washed, she requests the mother to lay them down flat in the 
bath. 
Example 7 
C: 'Cause the water's [? low] now ... you've got strong glue that one. 
M: Yes, I have rather, haven't I? Oh, they're beautiful. Thank you. 
C:Up. 
M: Oh, Mummy's fingers are so tired tonight. 
C: You can put them down. 
M: They've been very busy fingers, haven't they? 
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Child and mother continue playfully as if the tired fingers had never 
been mentioned. There is no point in multiplying such examples, but of 
the 24 mothers nearly three quarters mention the fact of tiredness at 
some time. Significantly, the mother's tiredness never appears to affect 
the flow of activity. Whether it is 'work' in the 'true' sense or not, it still 
'has to be done'. 
Moving now to the third aspect of woman's work in the home- that 
of providing emotional support, I come to a finding that was completely 
unexpected. Many of the mothers express the need for such support 
from their children -it is as if, the actual roles were being reversed 
through these sayings. In Example8 it is Karen's motherwhoseeks this 
support: 
Example 8 
M: Oh I've got a bad cold. 
C:Oh. 
M: Are you going to look after me ... eh? 
C: Oh. 
M: Oh ah, sorry. (COUGHING AGAIN) 
C: I can't when I have to go to school. 
M: But you don't have to go to school for a few days. 
C: I know. 
M: You going to look after me? 
C: Yeah. 
M:O.K. 
In Example 9, it is Nathan's mother who seeks such support and the 
child's bewilderment appears quite obvious: 
Example 9 
M: I have to lie down and put my leg in the air. Will you look after 
me? 
C:No. 
M: You won't! (SURPRISED) 
C: Why? 
M: You won't look after me? 
C: Where are you- where are you gonna do it? 
M: In the loungeroom [I think] 
C: No, do it here 
On the question of companionship, the data presents nothing 
significant, apart from the fact that mothers are lavish in the expression 
of appreciation whenever the child helps in the house - this happens 
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more often with girls than with boys. So what conclusions can we draw 
about the ways that mothers present themselves and their work to their 
children? 
I feel that there is a tension here. The child's active experience of 
happenings in the house must, in some sense, create the idea that 
mothers are busy; that their 'non-work' is in some sense 'work'. But the 
evaluation of that which claims the mother's physical efforts and 
attention is a different matter. With but a few possible exceptions, most 
human action is neither inherently good nor bad; it neither inherently 
merits prestige nor stigma, as Durkheim (1964) suggested; nor is the 
evaluation rationally commensurate with the benefit that might accrue 
from human action to (some sections of) the community. There is, thus, 
an essential arbitrariness about values attached to human actions. I 
shall comment briefly on this point below. Here let me say simply that 
while language is not the only means for (re)producing the values attached 
to human action, it is, nonetheless, one of the most powerful instruments 
for the purpose. If this premise is accepted, then, from the examples of mo· 
thers' sayings presented here, it would appear inevitable that the very young 
child, whose primary domain of experience is the home, would imbibe a 
view of woman's work in which it has the status of a toil imposed by 
necessity, a physical exertion which is not work, a tiresome enterprise 
which is inherently uninteresting and definitely lacking in demands on 
the higher functions of human intellect. As the young children walk out 
of their homes, where the foundations of their social being are laid, they 
are more than passively prepared to acquiesce in a confirmation of this 
early, perhaps not yet well articulated view, which will be strenghtened 
to a clear certainty, by experiences outside the house. The evidence from 
my data suggests, then, that the ontogenesis of ideology occurs early, if 
the ideology is to take hold. And the mechanisms for this ontogenesis are 
the habitual forms of communication, wherein the taken-for-granted 
nature of the social world is transmitted. A dominant ideology has to 
receive support at every level of human experience to survive, otherwise 
the fabric of inevitability is torn and glimpses of an alter-ideology are 
afforded which have the potential of undermining the credibility of the 
dominant ideology. Whatever one's reservations against or enthusiasms 
for the 'feminist' discourse, it certainly has performed the function of 
rupturing the credibility of one of the most dominant, most universally 
shared ideologies. 
Seen from this point of view, the distinction between deep and surface 
phenomena, so fashionable in today's academic discussions appears 
entirely unconvincing. There is no essential discontinuity between 
what human beings do, which includes what they say (Halliday: 1973; 
1978), and the social structure in which they have a locus. The social 
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structure comes into being and is continuously enacted through what 
human beings are doing, have done, and will do. It would, however, be 
naive to suppose that the ideology of woman's work can be changed 
simply by changing the habitual forms of maternal communication. 
Such an implication is nowhere intended in this paper. Habitual forms 
of communication spring from a perception of what appears socially 
relevant. There is thus a logical contradiction in entertaining the belief 
that the habitual forms of communication can be consistently and 
successfully changed without other accompanying changes; it is my 
understanding that this is one of the arguments Bernstein (1971) 
developed some time ago. Clearly this argument holds not because 
forms of communication, as many other human acts, display only 'the 
regularities and complexity perceived on the surface of the social world' 
(Sharp: 1981); rather, it is because ideologies, like other social facts, are 
orchestrated simultaneously at multiple levels of human existence. For 
example, the ideology of woman's work reaches out beyond the house 
into the market place where labour is sold for wages, and thus turned 
into 'work'. And no doubt that behaviour, in its turn, reaches out to 
other areas of socio·economic organization. The values attached to the 
actions of women in the privacy of their homes appear arbitrary- i.e. 
unmotivated- only so long as the wider context is ignored: within the 
four walls of the house, it appears extraordinary to think of woman's 
work as non-work; but as it makes contact with a wage-based economy, 
which operates in most societies today, its non-work nature is legitimized. 
One important reason why woman's work is not work lies in the fact 
that, of itself, it does not create the kind of economic independence 
granted to most wage-earners. At this stage of the analysis, the 
standard dictionaries are not 'misleading'; they are simply recording 
what we actually do. It seems to me that none of these levels of analysis 
is just a 'surface' behind which hides the 'ultimate truth'. The 
examination of ideology - and of social phenomena, in general -
requires a spiral model, rather than a box model in which the lid - the 
surface - is lifted to reveal the content - the ultimate truth. 
Subscribing to the age-old division of the ultimate cause existing 
independent of the effect, we tend to be looking for the 'underlying 
determinants of surface manifestation' (Sharp: 1981). I would suggest 
that Barthes' generalization regarding the relation between 'content' 
and 'form' in literature can be usefully extended to the study of the 
social as well, so that a social phenomenon would be like 'an onion, a 
construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains 
finally no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing 
except the infinity of its own envelopes- which envelop nothing other 
than the unity of its own surfaces.' (Barthes: 1971) 
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Rejecting, then, this dichotomy between the surface and deep, we can 
turn to language as a form of human action (Malinowski: 1923; 1935), 
which contributes, along with other semiotic systems, to the construc-
tion of the social world. A special focus on language is clearly required in 
the study of the on-set of forms of social consciousness. This is because 
the location of very young children in society is ambiguous. They are not 
active participants in many of its processes, and at least in the early 
years of their life, they may be said to enter society, as it were, 
secondarily through their contacts with adults. In this contact many of 
the social systems do not impinge upon them directly, but are refracted 
through the adult's systems of communication, amongst which language 
undoubtedly has an important place, if only due to the child's early-
developed ability to enter into linguistic processes. In talking about the 
role of maternal linguistic communication in the ontogenesis of a 
particular ideology, I have borrowed the expression 'fashions of 
speaking' from Whorf (1956), while the phrase 'habitual forms of 
communication' is derived from my reading of both Whorf and 
Bernstein. I believe the full import of these expressions needs to be 
understood to grasp their relevance to the role of language in the 
creation and maintenance of ideology. 
Even to imply that ideology, through however many layers of the 
'onion' of culture can finally be seen as language is at once claiming too 
much and saying too little. It is claiming too much, because of the simple 
fact of omission, it ignores the many nonverbal semiotic systems, whose 
existence side by side with language is not immaterial to the examination 
of ideology. The claim of a bi-unique connection between ideology and 
language- even though many-layer-mediated- could be valid only on 
the assumption that there exists a complete translatability between 
language and other semiotic systems. I would suggest that this 
assumption is questionable. To quote Foucault (1970): 
It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the 
visible, they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced 
to the other's terms: it is in vain that we say what we see; what we 
see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt 
to show, by the use of metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; 
the space where they achieve their splendour is not deployed by 
our eyes but that defined by the sequential elements of the syntax. 
Volosinov (1973) voices the same position: 
None of the fundamental, specific ideological signs is replacable 
wholly by words. It is ultimately impossible to convey a musical 
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composition or pictorial image adequately in words. Words cannot 
wholly substitute for a religious ritual; nor is there any really 
adequate verbal substitute for even the simplest gesture in 
human behaviour. To deny this would lead to the most banal 
rationalism and simplisticism. 
Complete translatability is a myth not only across two languages, but 
also across the verbal and non-verbal semiotics within the same culture. 
To the extent that this claim is true, it would be misleading to create the 
impression that the examination of ideology boils down to an examina-
tion of language. Languages may presuppose ideology; but, both for · ts 
genesis and its sustenance, ideology needs more than language. T 1e 
semiotic potential of a culture is not equal to the semantic potential of 
the languages of a culture (Halliday: 1973). It appears, then, that a 
linguist who would aspire to throw light on the construction and 
maintenance of ideology, must be prepared, first, to place the verbal 
semiotic side by side with other semiotic systems, and secondly, to 
examine the ways in which the various semiotic systems of a cui ture are 
calibrated to produce recognizable semiotic styles (Hasan: 1978; 1984a). 
I agree with Volo§inov that the various sign systems, operative within a 
culture, do not 'remain in isolation' from each other: but mutual support 
is not tantamount to mutual identity. 
On the other hand, the claim that language can be shown to be 
entirely a purveyor of ideology does not say enough; it provides no 
explicit indication of how the same language can be used in the 
construction and maintenance of qualitatively distinct ideologies. 
Granted that the notion of 'same language' is theoretically problematic, 
still, I believe, we would wish to say that both Halliday and Chomsky 
use the same language for the exposition of their ideologies about 
language, which are miles apart from each other. It is true that if two 
texts by these authors are placed side by side, the lexicogrammatical 
analysis of the two will show them to be different; but it is equally true 
that any two texts by any one of these authors will show lexicogram-
matical differences. So naturally there arises the question: which 
differences are significant for their ideologies and which are not? I 
believe that this question cannot be answered without some such 
concept(s) as 'orientation to coding' (Bernstein: 1971) or 'configurative 
rapport' and 'fashions or speaking' (Whorf: 1956) or 'consistency of 
foregrounding' (Hasan' 1984b) or 'semantic style' (Hasan: 1984a) or 
'semantic drift' (Butt: 1983), without implying that each of these 
concepts is entirely identical. A brief discussion of at least the Whorfian 
notions appears necessary_ 
The belief is widely accepted that "language is independent of any 
Ontogenesis of ideology 141 
specific purpose" (Hjelmslev:1961). More explicitly, by virtue of its 
internal design, every language has the potential of meeting any of the 
needs of its speakers. This is not because language is an impartial 
mirror of an immanent reality; rather it is because the speakers' reality 
is a reality largely created by language (Hasan:1984). This position 
implicit in Saussure's work (1966) is made explicit in Hjelmslev (1961), 
and better elaborated in Wharf's studies, who maintained that: 
... the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organized by our minds- and this means largely 
by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up -
organise it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, 
largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it this 
way- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community 
and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, 
of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are 
absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing 
to the organization and classification of data which the agreement 
decrees. 
I would draw attention to the latter half of this extract, according to 
which (a) the codified patterns of a language are universal to all its 
speakers; and (b) the flouting of these patterns is tantamount to the 
impossibility of talk. Had Whorf stopped at this point, he could have 
been accused more justifiably of a simplistic hypothesis about "mind in 
the grip of language" (Bolinger: 1975). But Whorf also made an important 
and systematic distinction between commonsense and un-commonsense 
knowledge, showing how the vicissitudes of the evolution of the latter 
are related to commonsense knowledge constructed by everyday fashions 
of speaking wherein the lexicogrammatical patterns of a language 
assume a background status, making certain concepts of reality appear 
inevitably real. There is thus a qualitative difference between habitual 
forms of communication and communications in which one is attempting 
to be, as it were, meta-semantic, though the latter is still not completely 
freed from the exigencies of the former (Halliday:1984). The possibility 
of the evolution of uncommonsense knowledge to the point where in 
some specific respect it runs counter to every-day reality constructed by 
language- e.g. the Einsteinian hypothesis- is important to Wharf's 
argument: it points to the tenuousness of the relationship between 
'codified patterns of language' and our pro-tem 'dissections of nature'. 
Such tenuousness would not exist if language were a mirror of reality. 
At the same time the relationship between the form of language and 
concepts of reality accounts for the persistence of commonsense 
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knowledge, according to which the speakers of English, for example, 
still subscribe to a concept of time as independent of space and as an 
aggregate of discrete, individual moments. For example, this concept of 
time is validated each time we say "each time". Whorf argues that the 
concepts of reality constructed by everyday habitual forms of communica· 
tion are accepted at some level of consciousness by all speakers of a 
language; that this tacit acceptance is essential to the possibility of talk. 
If we argue that the reality constructed by the background phenomena 
of a language- its automatized formal patterns- is a reality specific tc 
that language and not necessarily an account of how-things-really-are, 
then all speakers of a language may be said to subscribe to the same 
ideology at some level of consciousness, in the specific sense of seeing 
something as inevitably so. I would suggest that this kind of general 
"agreement" represents an infrastructure whose presence is a sine qua 
non for the construction of more specific i::leologies, e.g. that of woman's 
work. But Whorf showed quite clearly that even at the most general 
level of analysis the characterization of the ideology cannot be achieved 
by the examination of isolated lexicogrammatical patterns. He suggested 
that for such an examination we need the concept of configurative 
rapport. I believe by this expression Whorf meant the bringing together 
of those patterns of language which, in toto, construct a consistent 
semantic frame, leading to the "deep persuasion of a principle behind 
phenomena". One outstanding example of configurative rapport provided 
by Whorf is that which articulates the principle of objectification. 
Articulating this principle in SAE languages are phenomena - i.e. 
patterns of language- which from the point of view of lexicogrammar 
could only be considered heterogeneous. According to Whorf they 
include the number system, the tense system, the binomial pattern and 
the weakening of grammatical distinctions between abstract and 
concrete nouns. No single category here is by itself sufficient for the 
articulation of objectification, which can be glossed as the treatment of 
abstracts as if they were concrete objects with spatial extension and 
clear boundaries. Together they all point in the same direction. Using 
similar techniques, I have attempted to show (Hasan:l984a) that in 
Urdu there exists a configurative rapport between patterns of reference, 
ellipsis, and a bundle of patterns normally known as 'honorifics'. One 
principle this configurative rapport articulates is that of the sanctity of 
boundaries between hierarchies of social roles. 
In my view it is this kind of ·analysis which is capable of indicating 
which linguistic patterns are relevant to the construction of which 
ideology; and by so doing, such an analysis can provide a basis for 
understanding the meaning of lexicogrammatical differences between 
two or more texts - i.e. whether the differences are ideologically 
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significant or not. I do not think that we can argue that modality or 
suppressed negation (Kress and Hodge:1979) or subordination (Martin 
and Peters:1984) are inherently significant ideologically. Nor can we 
argue that all differences between texts are necessarily constitutive of 
different ideologies. Each one of the extracts from my data presented 
above differs from the others in some lexicogrammatical respect(s). But 
if by presenting this data I have been able to construct a picture of (at 
least some aspects of) the ideology of woman's work, then this is because 
there are linguistic patterns present whose constellation articulates a 
consistent semantic frame. Some of these patterns are (i) a contrast in 
attributes ascribed to male and female parent, whereby the latter 
carries the less desirable attribute(s); (ii) the presence of modals of 
obligation in the environment of material actions (e.g. cook, wash-up, 
make, clean) if the role of actor is realized by an item referring to mother; 
(iii) the textually ambiguous status of the ascription of physical 
exhaustion to mother, which ambiguity arises from the lack of cohesive 
support for such items as tired, exhausted etc.; (iv) the juxtaposition of 
work and behavioural processes e.g.Jook after, take care of, so that their 
equation is negated, whether explicitly or implicitly. Although a more 
meticulous analysis might reveal other relevant patterns, perhaps the 
above list is sufficient to support the claim that to the articulation of an 
ideology what is criteria! is the constellation of a set of linguistic 
patterns- a configuration of patterns in rapport with each other. 
But wherein does the origin of such constellations lie? If we consider 
language as a paradigmatic, then the system permits, certainly not all, 
but many combinations- which is one of the reasons why language can 
be independent of any specific purpose. For example, the se!e<;t-ion of 
almost any modal feature is possible with material action - not only 
have to wash up, but also can/might wash up; contrasting with the 
attribute silly for mummy, is also the possibility or the attributes 
clever/bright and so on. The selection of a specific constellation of 
patterns cannot, then, be seen as dictated by the system of language. If a 
specific set of options is selected it is there because it is capable of 
constructing the meanings the occasion is perceived to require. This 
implies that the patterns in a constellation- the patterns possessing a 
configurative rapport - display a semantic consistency. If in the 
context of control, it would be odd to find an utterance such as: I'd rather 
you didn't make so much noise, otherwise I'll hit you, this is because the 
meanings of the two messages are not consistent with each other; 
threats are not consistent with the granting of personal discretion. 
Using Bernstein's terminology we may say that the production of texts 
-language operating in the context of situation - requires 'coding 
orientation'. It is probably true that our ideas about the study of 
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meanings have not reached the stage where the kind of semantic 
consistencies I have drawn attention to can be described in an explicit 
way. But if linguists are interested in the examination of ideologies and 
other important matters concerning the relationship between language 
and society, then such advances in the study of language as a meaning 
potential will have to be made. And it is my belief that when progress in 
this area begins, we shall need to bridge the gulf between Saussure's 
'langue' and 'parole', probably very much along the lines suggested by 
Hjelmslev (1961), Firth (1957) and Halliday (1977a). If a specific 
configurative rapport - a constellation of linguistic patterns - is 
perceived as criteria! in the context of some ideology, it is not because 
the system of language has forced these patterns together; its contribu-
tion lies in providing the resources. The configurative rapport comes 
into existence and acquires a life because of our fashions of speaking as 
our fashions of speaking are the bearers of our ideology. It is through 
these fashions of speaking that the prehension between the patterns of a 
configurative rapport becomes established and we come to recognize 
that the deployment of such and such lexicogrammatical patterns 
constructs such and such a grouping of meanings, which finds support 
through such and such of our doings and thus perpetuates an ideology 
which we ourselves have created through our sayings and doings. 
Helen's mother is far from having attempted an analysis of these 
phenomena, but she appears to subscribe to some such view in the 
following extract. Helen is helping mother wash up a saucepan lid 
which appears to need a lot of scrubbing: 
C: You have to do it hard, don't you? 
M: Mm you do, don't you, yes ... 
C: Doesn't matter for you or me to do these. 
M: No. 
C: Because we can do it the right way, God teaches us. 
M: No God doesn't teach you things like that, it's mummy's job to 
teach you things like that. 
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